Abstract. In this paper, the game theory between the power plants' generation decision and the government's policy making is well described according to its characteristic. A bi-level multi-objective decision model is presented. In the model, the upper level enacts initial upper carbon limit, the limit will affect the power plant as an underlying decision-maker to make generation decision and also influence the whole objective function. Under this precondition, the underlying decision-makers choose its own optimal decision to meet its objective function, and finally upper policy makers make policy adjustment according to the reaction of underlying one. Among these dynamic interaction, optimal policy spheres can be drawn through the numeric result of the model.
Introduction
Rising ocean temperatures, occurring frequently extreme weather, rising global temperatures, ice melting faster than scientific predict in both West Antarctic and Greenland is occurring frequently. Most of these disasters result from more serious GHG emissions. To solve them is far beyond individual's ability. Government needs to enact efficient policies to reduce carbon emission and to control global warming meanwhile. Demanding for technologies has brought the industrial revolution since 20 th century. Continuously enriched and diverse material life makes us ignoring the environmental destruction and greenhouse effect. According to statistics, industrial production is one of the major source of GHG emissions. The cumulative of greenhouse gases has increased by more than 30% since the industrial revolution, among which carbon dioxide accounts for the largest proportion. From a policy perspective, Chinese government has already contributed a lot these years. After "Kyoto Protocol being adopted in 1997, the Stated Council issued "the Twelfth Five-Year Guideline for the Control of the Greenhouse Gas Emission" and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China also enacted 'Industrial sector response to climate change action plan (2012-2020)' in 2013. Our country change its role as "stay out" international carbon emission giants into a responsible one. We claims to decrease carbon emission by 50% per increased unit of industry value in 2020 compared with 2002. The tough target undoubtedly reflected our commitment to remain "APEC Blue". The latest issued 2014-2015 energy saving low carbon development action plan, conducted by the State Council, clearly states that carbon emission of per unit GDP should decrease individualy by more than 4% or 3.5% within two years. And further differential price and punitive tariff policies will be implemented.
In China, the power industry as the leading industry of the national economy has an inescapable responsiblity in carbon emission. The data of Statistical Yearbook shows that the amount of coal consumption in power industry in 2012 has reached up to 1.78 million ton, accounting for 50.62% of the total coal consumption. In other countries, since first and largest carbon emissions trading system (EUETS) was bulit in Europe Union, researches on the subject have emerged. Jaekyun [1] think power sector can guide other sectors in the aspect of setting carbon trading prices. The study employs the mixed complementarity problem, which is able to incorporate operation, investment, and emission trade decisions in the deregulated electricity market. Result show the allocation rules is the most effective method in carbon emission. From a technology perspective, Christopher [2] provided CA-TIMES optimization model for policy maker to estimate kinds of crucial carbon reduction technology. Results suggest CCS technology is the best one to achieve the lowest mitigation costs.
The scope of both the three mechanisms for EU carbon allocation and the assessment method applied in the way of carbon trading of power industry is too narrow to suit chinese power industry's current condition. In recent years, a large number of scholars in China has transferred from studying SO2 emssion and sewage permit allocation in power industry [3] [4][5] [6] to the study of initial allocation of carbon credits [7] [8] . We can learn from the experience of the existing trading system to a certain extent, but in the design of specific policy, we still requires a combination of our country's and industry's own characteristics. After learning from the EU emissions trading scheme, Zhou Hongchun [9] claimed that the establishment of an effective cap on emissions and thus achieve the intended reduction targets is necessary. In economic research, Minjun Shi [10] developed a China energy-economic-environmental policy model based on a dynamic CGE model,designed a carbon tax scenario,a cap-and-trade scenario and a policy mix scenario,and simulated the economic and mitigation effects under different scenarios. In sewage permit allocation area, based on principles of economy optimization, fair and production continuity, Shoude Li [11] gives a decision model of initial emission permits allocation, and discusses the character of the model.
In conclusion, our scholars have contributed a lot in both theoratical study and influence mechanism. Whereas, most studies forcus on initial carbon credits and carbon tax from the macro point of view, but lack of microscopic point of view, especially from the standpoint of the power industry. This paper investigate deeply into Chinese power sector. By assuming the purpose of carbon tax is not increase the govenment's revenue, we design a bi-level multi-objective decision programming.
Bi-Level Multi-Objective Programming
Bi-level decision problems is called Stackelberg in game theory, in which the upper level decision-makers are called leaders, while the underlying level decision-makers are called followers. Their decision process obeys the following decision-making process: the upper level transfer certain information to the underlying one, such as the overall carbon reduction target in this paper. Then, the underlying one makes decisions according to their own interest or preferences under the circumstances of these information. Thirdly, the upper one make decisions in line with the overall interests. Finally, two parties achieve balance.
The above description can be constructed as the following mathematical model: 
. . , 0 s t g x y ≤ (4) Based on the above origin model, we construct a picture to demonstrate the decision process of our bi-level multi-objective programming, see in Figure 1 . The upper level is the government , its objective functions are to maximize social revenue and to minimize the overall carbon emission. The underlying level is each power plant, its objective function is maximize the revenue. The revenue concludes environmental econimic benefits from carbon reduction and the saving from carbon tax or raised cost. 
Model
This paper consist the following background: suppose the government allocate total carbon emission quantity E to the power industry annually, each power plant takes up carbon emission i e (i=1,2,…,n).
Under the goernment target of encourage carbon reduction the more the better, we have e was set with the amount of last year's 0 E as a reference. Since we have only implemented carbon intensity reduction, relevant requirement for the total amount allocation still doesn't exist. In this paper, we assume all power plant should constrain carbon emision amount less than 20% of current amount. Upper level decision variables i X (i=1,2,…,n) represent power plant i failed to achieve the carbon reduction target and willing to pay a carbon tax 1 T in exchange for that amount, i Y (i=1,2,…,n) represent power plant i failed to achieve carbon reduction target but willing to increase the cost of abatement 2 T in exchange. All plant can choose to pay carbon tax or increase cost depending on their circumstances when doesn't make the emission target. We suppose power plant i's direct carbon emission is i e every year. In order to reach the total reduction target, both upper and underlying level programming owns the same restriction as below: 
Conclusions
The model we set analyzes the effect of initial carbon tax to the power plant's decision making. We set constrains of maximizing social benefit, minimizing carbon emission, maximizing plants' revenue, minimizing cost of abatement or carbon tax and maximizing environmental revenue. All these constrains help us to achieve an optimal scope of carbon tax and initial carbon credits, with the help of both upper and underlying's objective function. Through designing a proper algorithm, the model can achieve a reasonable range of carbon tax and an optimal initial carbon credits, which can provide suggestions and reference for carbon reduction policy maker in China.
